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Summary
This article examines the political framework of “novi kurs” (“New Course”) 
from the beginning of the 20th century, its strategic aims and its function within 
the battle of different visions of a South Slavic state. The evidence shows that 
the new political direction contributed to the improvement of conflicting rela-
tions between Croats and Serbs, but, at the same time, it had a negative impact 
on the Croatian-Slovenian alliance along the Adriatic coast. In the context of 
the latter relation, the author analyses the reactions of Slovenians from Trieste 
and Primorska region who were supposed to be the collaterals due to what 
seemed to be an agreement between Serbs and Croats. However, although 
the “New Course” may be seen as long expected consensus between Cro-
ats and Serbs, a thorough analysis undermines that thesis. This became evi-
dent with the formation of two political factions within the Croatian-Serbian 
Coalition in which different views on the fundamental geopolitical parameters 
of the South Slavic state were developed.
Keywords: “New Course”, Adriatic Issue, Dalmatia, Kingdom of Croatia-Sla-
vonia, National Question
Introduction
The beginning of the 20th century was marked by extremely dynamic relations in 
the triangle of Slovenians, Croats, and Serbs, which was manifested through the 
discussion on the future of a South Slavic political formation. The latter was a kind 
of common platform used by political groups to present their ideas and therefore to 
improve their position in the triangle relations. Each side tried to incorporate its own 
national goals into the idea of a South Slavic state. These goals were often mutually 
exclusive, which seems to be one of the main sources of the instability for both Yu-
goslav states formed after the two world wars (Ivašković, 2019). According to Ivo 
Banac (1988: 149), the reason for this was the fact that partial national ideologies 
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among South Slavs had been already formed well before the idea of Yugoslavism 
started to take place in the political reality. In line with that the idea of a common 
state of South Slavs was based more on the belief in political benefits for all the in-
cluded nations than on the thesis of their cultural homogeneity, which was sincerely 
cherished only among minor political groups. The diversity of ambitions, which 
were supposed to be satisfied within the South Slavic state, resulted with the whole 
spectrum of state visions, which differentiated regarding the size, the location of the 
political-administrative centre, the internal state division, and, of course, regarding 
the position of the future state within the international community. 
The ambition of this article is to analyse one part of the South Slavic state vi-
sions’ spectrum and to illustrate how this phenomenon was influenced by the move-
ment of “New Course”, what the main goals and strategies of Croats and Serbs 
within that political course were, and the reactions of Slovenians directly affected 
by the new geopolitical plan.
The Context of South Slavic Alternatives’ Production
The beginning of the new century and the disproportion between the economic and 
political (military) power raised the question and consequentially uncertainty re-
garding the future and territorial scope of European empires. This implicated many 
opportunities and at the same time great dangers for smaller nations that were an 
integral part of these states. This also implied the question of the South Slavs’ politi-
cal fate, and raised the issue of defining territorial scope of their potential political 
formation. Economic trends affected a relatively fast growing population and the 
fragmentation of arable land. From the beginning of the 19th century, the population 
density in the South Slavic areas grew from about 20 to more than 60 inhabitants 
per square kilometre at the beginning of the 20th century (Lampe, 2000: 73-74).1 Be-
side an emigration process, the increase of population resulted with the migration 
to suburban and urban centres, which led to changes in the economic and educa-
tional structure of the population. In Slovenia and Croatia, a large part of the bour-
geois still had German (Austrian) or Hungarian origins, but its political domination 
1 Serbia had the highest growth rate in late 19th century, where 1.3 million inhabitants in 
1870 increased to 2.91 million in 1910. Croatia-Slavonia also had remarkable growth (from 
1.84 million in 1870 to 2.73 in 1910), while the demographic increase was slightly smaller 
in Dalmatia (from 0.46 to 0.63 million). Interestingly, Slovenian areas recorded a decline in 
population (from 1.13 to 1.06 million), which was mainly consequence of the emigration from 
the parts where the soil and the existing density did not allow further growth. The absolute 
fastest growth was recorded by Montenegro, where population rose from only 67.5 thousand 
to 238 thousand inhabitants. However, that meant the Montenegrin areas still had less than 25 
inhabitants per square kilometre.
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was endangered by the growth of the Slavic urban population and its consequential 
involvement in political life. In this context, the South Slavic question became an 
important issue within the Habsburg Monarchy, where numerous versions of a Yu-
goslav concept were emerging not only among Slovenians, Croats and Serbs, but 
among Austrian and Hungarian political elites as well. 
The majority of ideas which opposed the concept of South Slavs within the 
Habsburg state were generated in Serbia. Indeed, after the rise of Karađorđevićs, 
irrespective to the cultural and territorial scope of South Slavic ideas, anti-German-
ism was one of the basic paradigms emphasised in all Serbian variations of the Yu-
goslav state concept. The latter clearly reflected the fundamental geopolitical func-
tion of the process of South Slavic unification as had been perceived among Serbian 
politicians. From this perspective, the Habsburg rulers embodied a German threat 
to the very existence of the Serbian state. Therefore, for Karađorđevićs any kind 
of Serbian integration into the central European federation under the leadership of 
the Habsburg dynasty was unacceptable due to the whole spectrum of cultural and 
political factors. Indeed, that would imply a loss (at least partial) of Serbian state-
hood, sovereign rights, which from Belgrade’s point of view implied a reduction 
of Serbian political rights on the level from the era of Ottoman rule. This would 
also imply connecting the Serbian population to the catholic majority within Habs-
burg Monarchy, and would make the territory of Serbia some kind of periphery or 
even worse; a potential space for Vienna’s or Budapest’s trading maneuvers in the 
Balkans. Excluding every possibility of joining the rest of the South Slavs within 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire implied significantly reduced maneuvering space for 
building Yugoslav concepts in Serbia and at the same time clearly defined its basic 
framework. However, regardless of the main political goals, the manifestation of 
the Serbian Yugoslav idea depended on Serbia’s international situation. During the 
periods of a strong Serbian international position the Great-Serbian character of Yu-
goslavia was emphasised, while in the moments of Serbia’s weakness the Panslavic 
rhetoric and the equality of all South Slavs was used (Ivašković, 2012). Following 
the ambition of incorporating Serbs from Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina to the Kingdom of Serbia, its political agenda included an attempt 
to create a broad political coalition on Austro-Hungarian soil that would be reluc-
tant to be ruled by Viennese authorities. In this context, all leverages, including the 
engagement of the Hungarian anti-Habsburg political forces, were used. As the Ser-
bian writer Stanoje Stanojević acknowledged in his texts: “At that time, the work 
of Serbian youth and the struggle of the Serbian people in Austria began for their 
political rights and freedoms: the Serbs in Hungary and in the Kingdom of Croatia, 
Slavonia and Dalmatia in alliance with the Hungarians and the Croats began their 
fight against Vienna” (Pilar, 1990: 350).
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From the Serbian point of view, the crucial task was to gain the support of at 
least one part of the catholic South Slavs within Habsburg Monarchy, which was 
imposed by the fact of otherwise huge disparities between the Serbian and Croa-
tian “Yugoslav” concepts. Thus, it is not a surprise that Croats gained more atten-
tion in the Serbian media at the beginning of the 20th century. Of course, only those 
who were criticising the traditional Croatian attitude towards the South Slavic is-
sue and its resolution within the Habsburg state got the opportunity for publishing. 
Fran Potočnjak, for example, rejected Strossmayer’s idea of Yugoslavism and criti-
cised its Habsburg and catholic political framework (Bakić, 2004: 155-157). How-
ever, that group had only marginal influence within the Austro-Hungarian political 
sphere. Generally speaking, there were no strong anti-German movements among 
South Slavs in the Habsburg Monarchy like in Serbia. Moreover, a large part of the 
Croatian and Slovenian political elite cherished the belief that their areas belong 
to the Central-European framework within the Habsburg Monarchy. The national 
catholic political parties of Slovenians and Croats were especially striving to pre-
serve the Habsburg framework as a shield from other great powers, and at the same 
time to reform the Monarchy in order to increase the degree of Slovenian and Croa-
tian political emancipation. While this tendency among Croats was articulated in 
the political goal of reviving the Croatian historical kingdom and integrating the ter-
ritories that the latter included, Slovenians sought to consolidate power at the low-
er level in the areas with the dominant Slovenian majority. In addition to this, the 
Slovenian catholic nationalists were, in the absence of Slovenian statehood institu-
tions, characterised by the reliance on natural law or on attaching Slovenians to the 
Croatian historical statehood concept. This implicated Zagreb as the centre in the 
Austro-Slavic or catholic South Slavic concepts, which represented a continuity of 
the Croat-centric South Slavic visions from the 19th century, whether they were in-
clined to Strossmayer’s or to Starčević’s idea. The Slovenian catholic parties there-
fore accepted Croatia as the centre of the South Slavs for additional reasons. Firstly, 
the Slovenian conservatives were in ideological harmony with the Croatian catholic 
parties (Rahten, 2005), and secondly, Croatia-Slavonia was the largest South Slavic 
unit within the Habsburg Monarchy (according to some estimates it accounted for 
55.77% of Croats out of their total number in Austria-Hungary) (Lovrenčić, 1972: 
22). Finally, the fact was that only the Croatian statehood arguments were recog-
nized by Austro-Hungarian authorities.
Beside the Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian national ambitions, other interest 
groups were also considering the idea of creating a South Slavic state within the 
frame of their geopolitical vision. From the perspective of the Habsburg authorities, 
the unresolved South Slavic issue was a factor of destabilisation for the Empire. The 
Croatian dissatisfaction with their separation among the Austrian and Hungarian 
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parts was something that should have been resolved as soon as possible, otherwise 
Croatia could become the centre of anti-Habsburg movement within Austria-Hun-
gary, which was already the case among Serbs both inside and outside of the dual 
Monarchy. The method of making decisions on key administrative and territorial 
reforms that would satisfy the Habsburg South Slavs and distance them from Serbia 
was extremely difficult due to the need of the Hungarian consensus. Therefore, the 
political strategy of the Habsburg authorities consisted of giving some concessions 
to the Slovenes and Croats, while the main foreign policy aim was to undermine the 
conditions for creating a state that would be a strong centrifugal factor for the Habs-
burg South Slavs (Pleterski, 1975: 52). This strategy included preventing the inte-
gration of Montenegro and Serbia, and their annexation of the lands from the dying 
Ottoman state. However, at that time, Austria-Hungary found itself surrounded by 
countries which were much more in a competitive than collaborative relationship 
with the Habsburg Monarchy. Irrespective of the general perception of the natural 
ally, Germany represented a latent danger due to its promotion of German nation-
alism and the tendency to unite all Germans into one state (Rahten, 2001: 8-9). 
Similarly, Italy, which was a formal Austro-Hungarian ally after 1882, also actively 
promoted the irredentist tendencies among the Austro-Hungarian Italians (ibid.: 9). 
At the same time, the Habsburg political elite could not ignore the Russian danger, 
which was, despite its defeat in the war with Japan, far greater than the danger of 
the Turkish Empire, which was more concerned with its own survival. The Balkan 
area therefore represented a great opportunity and a danger at the same time for the 
Habsburg Monarchy, due to the uncertainty of who and in what way would capture 
the territory of the Ottoman Empire. 
The international state of affairs affected the internal situation of the Habs-
burg Monarchy. Any attempt to resolve the South Slavic issue was blocked due to 
the lack of inner Austria-Hungary consensus. The first “anti-Austrian” vote was, of 
course, represented by the Hungarian political elites, which tried to maintain the du-
al system from 1867 at any cost. The latter enabled Hungary to control the vast terri-
tory and the position of the only relevant counterpart to Vienna for all key decisions 
at the state level. The second voice against the South Slavs’ political emancipation 
was represented by German national groups which were opposed to everything that 
smelled of incorporating South Slav territories into a third entity within the Monar-
chy. The Carinthian Germans were describing that as a “struggle till death” for all 
the lands south of the Drava River (Rahten, 2005: 196-198). The dominance of the 
national component over other ideological dimensions was also confirmed by the 
German catholic-socialists who adhered to the national demands of other German 
political parties (Ivašković, 2012). An additional blow for the Slovenian and Croa-
tian unit was the absence of Czech support. In the potential South Slavic unit within 
Ivašković, I., The Implications of the “New Course” Strategy
223
the Habsburg Monarchy, the Czech politicians perceived the threat of remaining 
the only Slavs in the Austrian part of the Monarchy, which would undermine their 
efforts for their own territorial-administrative emancipation. This situation greatly 
reduced the possibilities for a successful implementation of any strategy that would 
result with an internal reorganisation into a triune Monarchy.
It seems that the South Slavic issue was of great importance for too many poli-
tical groups. At the same time, that issue was not only beyond South Slavic political 
actors, but it also raised interests among politicians outside of the Monarchy. The 
conflicting objectives, accompanied by a high level of interests, prevented the con-
sensus among the critical majority in terms of the concrete territorial delimitation 
of the third unit. These circumstances created a climate, which on one hand fostered 
the emergence of new political orientations, while encouraging the existing ones to 
search for different methods for the realisation of their political goals. In this con-
text, the political movement “New Course” was born. It was fostered by primarily 
Croatian politicians, who seemed to be tired of more than three decades of waiting 
for the reform of the dual system, and decided to go along the new revolutionary 
political path. This movement gave up attaining the support of the ruling Austrian 
political groups, and sought alternatives in the creation of wider opposition strategic 
partnerships. For the “New Course” members, it was crucial to gain support from 
neighbouring countries, especially from Serbia and Italy, while in the wider politi-
cal scene the movement tried to get the support from France, Russia, Bulgaria, and 
even the US (Ivašković, 2017: 99).
The Search for an Agreement with Italians
The “New Course” movement had the centre in Rijeka and Dalmatia and spread re-
latively quickly along the Adriatic coast. The Croatian, Italian, and Slovenian nation-
al elements accompanied by Austrian government interventions formed quadrila-
teral relations in the Northern Adriatic. However, although not strongly present in 
Kvarner, Istria, and Trieste, Serbs from the Dalmatian hinterland had an indirectly 
significant impact on political events in that area. By the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury, Croats and Slovenians were jointly defending their own interests against the 
forces of Italian irredentism. In such a mutual relationship, the Slovenians from the 
Primorska region defended the Croatian primacy in Zadar and Rijeka, while the 
Croatian newspapers supported establishing Slovenian institutions in Trieste (Pa-
hor, 2004). The year 1903 marked a sudden turn in these relations, since some of 
the Croatian journals started an intensive campaign for the Croatian-Italian national 
agreement. That was a thoughtfully developed new strategy, which was indicated 
by the fact that the new ideas were simultaneously fostered in all spheres of politi-
cal life. Ante Tresić-Pavičić (1867–1949) took over the key role in the sphere of 
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diplomacy, while Frano Supilo (1870–1917) took the initiative to spread the idea in 
public life. In the summer of 1903, the latter began intensively publishing articles 
that favoured the Italians who were until then very unpopular in Croatian journals 
(Pleterski, 1975: 55). In the same year, the journals, which promoted the South 
Slavic-Italian alliance on the new foundations, also experienced expansion in Tri-
este, where besides the existing “Slovanska misel” (Slavic Thought) and “Trijali-
zam” (Trialism) Tresić-Pavičić began to publish “Jadran” (Adriatic). Indicatively 
these Croatian journals increasingly started to use Italian language in their articles. 
At the same time, similar processes took place in Dalmatia, where Ante Trumbić 
(1864–1938) took the leading role in the Croatian-Italian alliance. Trumbić pro-
moted the thesis about marginal disputes between the Italians and Croats, which 
could not represent a serious threat for the agreement that would wipe out even the 
slightest trace of national-political antagonism between those two nations. Interest-
ingly, almost at the same time the switch in Croatian-Italian relations reflected on 
Trumbić’s exposure of Pan-Germanism as a factor that jeopardised the vital inte-
rests of both Croats and Italians (ibid.: 57).
А completely different atmosphere was in Primorska and Istria where scepti-
cism prevailed regarding the making of any kind of arrangements with the Italians 
about the delimitation line between them on one side and Slovenians and Istrian 
Croats on the other. This particular attempt of solving the South Slavic issue within 
the Habsburg Monarchy was therefore no different from the previous plans. The na-
tional relations in the Primorska region, in Trieste, and in Istria were tense, which 
could have been noticed in the writings of the “Edinost” (Unity), the Slovenian li-
beral journal from Trieste, and its Italian counterpart “L’Istria” (Ivašković, 2019). 
Already at the end of 1903, the latter proclaimed that Istria would be definitely Ita-
lian, while the Slavic population was supposed nolens volens to be loyal and to re-
cognise the Italian character of the peninsula (“Edinost”, 26 November 1903). On 
the other hand, “Edinost” strongly protested this solution and insisted on the inte-
gration of Istria, Trieste and the whole of Primorska region in the framework of the 
South Slavic unit within the Habsburg Monarchy (“Edinost”, 21 November 1903). 
It seemed that there was practically no manoeuvring space for an agreement be-
tween the two sides, the Slovenians and Italians from Trieste, Primorska, and Istria. 
The Italian side continually tried to transfer this process of solving the national is-
sue to higher and wider level, and therefore sought a negotiator who would have 
the legitimacy of negotiating over the entire area of the Adriatic Sea and its coastal 
resorts. Thus, from the Italian point of view, it was far more expedient to choose 
Croatian interlocutors considering the fact that at the given moment the word from 
Belgrade had not yet had the legitimacy of representing Habsburg South Slavs. It 
seemed that with Croatian acceptance of this role Slovenians from Trieste, Primor-
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ska, and Istria were left on their own overnight. However, it also seemed that this 
was not an arrangement only between Italians and Dalmatian Croats, but it also had 
at least silent support from the dominant Slovenian political force gathered within 
the Slovenian People’s Party (Slovenska ljudska stranka – SLS). The latter was led 
by Ivan Šušteršič (1863–1925), who, at the beginning of the 20th century, was the 
most influential Slovenian politician, and decided himself that the negotiations with 
the Italian side on behalf of the Slavic Union (the strongest mainly Slovenian and 
Croatian parliamentary group in Vienna) should be left to the Istrian Croat Vjeko-
slav Spinčić (1848–1933). This indirectly showed that the priority for Slavic Uni-
on was to preserve the largest share of Istria, while Trieste and Primorska were set 
aside. In line with this thesis, there was also an agreement on joint efforts between 
Italian and Slovenian conservatives for the establishment of an Italian Law faculty 
in Trieste and its Slovenian version in Ljubljana. On the other hand, Slovenians and 
Croats from Trieste gained the right to use their languages in the German Gymnasi-
um. Of course, “Edinost” was strongly disappointed with such arrangements, while 
Croats from Dalmatia were supporting their acceptance (Pleterski, 1975: 61-62). 
The manifestations of Slovenian disappointment were not limited only to liberal and 
social democratic journals. On March 27, 1904, for example, members of “Edinost” 
accompanied by Social Democrats and the Croatian representatives from Istria pro-
tested against the “suicide of the Trieste Slovenes” (“Edinost”, 28 March 1904).
Although Slovenian discontent was remarkable, it seems that in the first phase 
the creators of “New Course” did not care much about it. Due to the German and 
Italian interests, they considered Slovenian ambitions in Trieste geopolitically un-
realistic (Ivašković, 2013). Therefore, every criticism of the new policy came under 
the fierce condemnation, while supporters of the new political movement tried to 
prove that critics were playing according to Austrian notes. The same argument was 
used against those Croats who opposed the “New Course”. Those critiques, which 
could not be attributed to Vienna’s policy, were on the other hand simply ignored. 
“New Course” leaders did not consider the domestic opposition as the real threat, 
and it seems that the greater problem for them was the divisions on the Italian side. 
An example of this was the deal reached by Ante Tresić-Pavičić and Riccioto Gari-
baldi (1847–1924), which was later strongly rejected by the Italian official repre-
sentatives from Trieste (Pleterski, 1975: 64).
Croatian supporters of the arrangement with Italians, however, did not have il-
lusions regarding interests of the other party of the agreement. Regardless of indi-
vidual political affiliation, everyone on the Italian side saw this as the possibility of 
a political-geographical demarcation on the Adriatic coast, hoping that the shift in 
Croatian strategy and consequentially the positioning of the South Slavic centre to 
the east would diminish the importance of Trieste, the Primorska region, and Istrian 
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peninsula for the key decision makers on the South Slavic side. For Croats within 
“New Course”, this was probably an additional stimulative factor for the accelera-
tion of the negotiations. Indeed, the debate about the status of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina was already rising on the political horizon. From this aspect, it was necessary to 
do everything in order to finally revitalise the concept of Croatian statehood. There-
fore, the Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia could represent a strong centri-
petal force that would attract the incorporation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thus 
the realisation of the Croatian state idea. The same strategy was later used by Mi-
nister Alois Lexa von Aehrental (1854–1912) within the trialist idea (Wank, 1963). 
With this in mind, Ante Tresić-Pavičić offered to Italians Croatian support for their 
ambitions in Albania, while at the same time hoping for Italian help in preserving 
a strong Bulgarian state, which would neutralize Serbia’s pressures on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Ivašković, 2017: 104). The Croatian rush affected their willingness 
to negotiate and to gradually increase the piece of the territory offered to the Ita-
lians. At first, the Croatian side was prepared to accept the demarcation line pro-
moted by Milan Marjanović (1879–1955) who took the national principle as a cri-
terion of territorial delineation; Trieste and the western part of the Istrian peninsula 
would become Italian, while the rest should belong to the Croatian-Slovenian ma-
jority (Pleterski, 1975: 65). Both sides should also guarantee some kind of minority 
rights for Italians who would stay on South Slavic territory and vice versa. Supilo 
also bowed to this idea, although he soon realised that Italian appetites were much 
bigger. Slovenians and Croats in Istria, Trieste, and Primorska region remained re-
luctant to this solution. They considered there was no actual readiness for minority 
rights protection and that any kind of agreement, which would leave them on the 
Italian side, was actually their conviction to forced assimilation.
Partnership with Serbs and Hungarians
Due to the large Serb population in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the Syrmia re-
gion of the Croatia-Slavonia unit, and in the Dalmatian hinterland, resolving is-
sues between Croats and Serbs was of strategic importance for the “New Course” 
on its way of achieving internal South Slav unity. The precondition for this was 
the creation of a strong Croatian coalition on January 29, 1903, when the “Ob-
zor” and “Hrvatska domovina”2 factions joined with Advanced youth and Croatian 
workers’ community into the Croatian Party of Rights (Hrvatska stranka prava – 
HSP) (Lovrenčić, 1972: 153). The formation of the Croatian Block continued in 
April 1905, when the parliamentary groups of the Croatian National Party (Hrvat-
ska narodna stranka – HNS) and the HSP joined into the new club named Croatian 
2 “Obzor” and “Hrvatska domovina” were two (political) journals published in Zagreb.
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Party (Hrvatska stranka – HS). The key points of the agreement clearly indicated 
the HS’s fundamental goals. The first point declared: “The Croatian Party resolutely 
demands the merger of the Kingdom of Dalmatia and the Kingdom of Croatia and 
Slavonia on the basis of national and state law, and considers the unification as a 
major step of the supreme national ambition to connect all the territories that are 
inhabited by Croats into one independent state body” (Pilar, 1990: 344). The next 
point of agreement emphasised the demand for Croatian language to have all rights 
in public life and educational system in Dalmatia. It also declared that the HS will 
strive for the connection of Dalmatian ports with the natural hinterland in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. After the definition of Croatian territorial and cultural goals, the 
third point defined the Croatian relationship with Serbs, namely “that the Croatian 
and Serbian people represent unified nation in blood and language, and that they are 
inextricably attached to the territory, so the Croatian Party will strive for the elimi-
nation and suppression of conflicts between them” (Bakić, 2004: 152-153). The 
document was obviously a mixture of liberal and conservative elements. However, 
the main strategic aim of the new party was to integrate Croatian territories on the 
basis of Croatian statehood right, which should give Croatia a better starting point 
for political, economic, and cultural life within the Habsburg Monarchy. This with-
out doubt was a Croat-centric concept, which pragmatically tried to obtain the sup-
port of Serbian population within Austro-Hungary. 
A liberal-conservative program with a Croatian base was of course criticised 
by some Serbian politicians. The document was labelled as a nationalistic Croatian 
program, which divided South Slavs and jeopardised their common future. Serbian 
diplomat Jovan Jovanović Pižon (1869–1939) thus wrote: “This program and the 
acts of Dalmatian Croats cannot be rejoiced by Serbs. Its first paragraph, besides all 
ambiguities, can be considered as purely nationalistic Croatian program, which is 
narrow, without sight, and thus without future. At home Hungarians, in the Balkans 
Germans, and Croats speak about their unification. ... Instead of the broad program 
for all South Slavs, the old purely Croatian program. Instead of Strossmayer, Antun 
Starčević. Instead of Yugoslavia, the Great Croatia” (ibid.: 154). The plan for the 
integration of the Habsburg Serbs into the Yugoslav concept within the Habsburg 
Monarchy, which declaratively offered Serbs equality, but whose main goal was to 
obtain them for the Croatian political program, quickly diverted most of the Serbian 
politicians within and outside of Austria-Hungary. Therefore, it was necessary to 
think about points in which agreement could be reached with certain concessions. 
This issue divided Croatian political parties. On one side, the Croatian opposition 
led by Josip Frank (1844–1911) perceived the Serbian population in Croatian areas 
as a Belgrade’s Trojan horse with a function of preventing the revival of Croatian 
statehood (Ivašković, 2017: 104). Other parties saw the Serbian population in the 
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Habsburg Monarchy as the leverage with which internal unity could be achieved, 
and through which obtaining Belgrade’s support for Croatian political demands 
would be easier.
Unlike Serbian political circles, the “New Course” succeeded in gaining sup-
port among Croats from Banovina in its beginnings, especially among youth move-
ments from the 1890s, which had a diversified activity in towns within the Croatia-
Slavonia unit (Lovrenčić, 1972: 39-89). In fact, the only loud opponent of “New 
Course” was the Pure Party of Rights (Čista stranka prava – ČSP) of Josip Frank, 
which remained isolated on the Croatian political scene with the absence of the ca-
pacity for making any kind of coalitions. The weakness of the ČSP was evident at 
the end of August 1905 in Dubrovnik when Frank’s resolution, according to which 
Croatia would demand detaching from Hungary, was rejected (Pilar, 1990: 343-
345). This marked the beginning of forming the opposing resolution. On 3 October 
1905, all Croatian parties (with the exception of the ČSP) met in Rijeka and after 
two days of consultations adopted a document which clearly outlined all the ele-
ments of the “New Course”’s political goals. A long introduction defined Hungary 
as a natural Croatian partner and concluded that neither the Croatian nation nor its 
political representatives will have any intention of acting against Hungarian inte-
rests. Similarly, as in relation with Italians, the resolution promoted the thesis that 
the movement for a greater degree of Croatian independence would not in any way 
contradict the Hungarians’ national ambitions: “Croatian representatives consider 
as their duty to fight alongside the Hungarian people for the fulfilment of all state 
rights and freedoms, in the belief that these rights and freedoms will benefit the 
Croatian and Hungarian people; and this will make the basis of a lasting agreement 
between the two nations” (ibid.: 345).
The central part of the resolution declared the unification of Croatia and Sla-
vonia with Dalmatia as the fundamental political goal. Indicatively, the word used 
for this act was not “merger”, but the “reincorporation” of Dalmatia into the triune 
kingdom: “The achievement of this purpose, intended for mutual benefit, is condi-
tioned first by the reincorporation of Dalmatia to the Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia, 
and Dalmatia to which it already belongs virtually and legally” (ibid.). The choice 
of word confirmed that this plan did not demand the creation of a new entity, but 
rather the separation of Dalmatia from Austria and its reintegration to the Croatian 
kingdom. Thus, although Austria was not mentioned directly in the document, the 
act itself had an extremely anti-Austrian note. In fact, it promoted the thesis that 
Austria was the biggest obstacle in the way of the “full autonomy” of Hungary and 
Croatia as well (ibid.).
From today’s point of view, it is slightly easier to evaluate the motives for such 
a political strategy. Although the choice of a strategic partner, which throughout 
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the history certainly represented a greater danger for the existence of Croatian po-
litical subjectivity, may seem as unreasonable, the ambition of finding a new path, 
which was caused by frustration due to Austrian inactivity in solving the Croatian 
and South Slavic issue, is understandable. The second important factor was the fact 
that the Croatian geopolitical core was part of the Hungarian part of the Monarchy, 
which enabled flourishing of anti-Austrian alternatives. That was one of the main 
reasons why for example the Czechs could not afford similar strategies, and were 
throughout the whole 19th and the beginning of the 20th century much more care-
ful in relation to Vienna. An additional cause for a new strategic orientation lies in 
the context of resolving Croatian-Serbian political issues. As Croatian members of 
the new political movement were trying to build a bridge for cooperation with Ser-
bian political parties, they had to reduce the gap between two different South Slavic 
ideologies, and the easiest way for the Croatian side was to adopt anti-Germanism, 
which was one of the fundaments of Serbian Yugoslavism. Of course, this anti-Aus-
trian position was welcomed by Kossuth’s nationalistic Hungarian party, who un-
derstood the Rijeka resolution as an act that would take Dalmatia out of Austria and 
incorporate it into the territory of the St. Stefan’s crown: “We welcome our brothers 
Croats and Dalmatians, and we remind them that we have shared with them all the 
rights that we have so far achieved. Austria made us angry and the Almighty himself 
will help us to bring back Dalmatia through Croatia to the crown of St. Stefan. We 
are expecting you with love and with a lot of hope” (ibid.: 347-348). Thus, accord-
ing to the initial plan, the Croatian parties of “New Course” should have acquired 
two new allies and only one new opponent.
The Issue of Slovenians from Primorska Region and Trieste
“New Course” strategy did not affect only the Austrian political elite negatively, it 
put the Slovenians from Primorska region and Trieste in a very unfavourable posi-
tion as well. They were not invited to Rijeka, which undermined the idea of South 
Slavic reciprocity and indicated an unwillingness to solve the issue of Slovenians in 
the Adriatic. On one side, the strongest conservative Slovenian political group, SLS, 
could not participate in the anti-Habsburg coalition, as that would be in diametrical 
opposition to its political program and also to the political agenda of their political 
partners from Croatia. On the other hand, the Slovenian Liberals in the People’s Pro-
gressive Party (Narodno napredna stranka – NNS) could not participate in the “New 
Course” due to plans which included leaving to the Italians parts of the territory 
which was according to Slovenian Liberals considered Slovenian. Therefore, Slo-
venian criticism for the Rijeka resolution came from both Slovenian political poles. 
The conservative journal “Slovenec” argued: “From a Slovenian standpoint no Slo-
venian politician can defend the resolutions because it separates us from the Croats 
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and its implementation would implicate our national death. The irony was that they 
adopted such a resolution in Rijeka, the city for which the Croats should fight until 
the last man standing! We will not allow divisions between the South Slavs in our 
empire in any way, and we hope that the majority of Croats will search for a different 
future than those gentlemen in Rijeka did” (“Slovenec”, 10 October 1905). 
The resolution was also criticised by “Naš list”, a weekly journal of former 
NNS members, which labelled the document as an act that negated the solidarity 
efforts of all South Slavs for their political independence (Pleterski, 1975: 71-72). 
Leaving a huge part of Slovenians outside of South Slavic political context and 
leaning on Italy and Hungary was severely condemned. The editorial board of the 
journal wrote that the reintegration of Dalmatia to the Croatian unit and indirectly 
to the Hungarian part of the Monarchy would greatly strengthen the eastern half of 
the Empire, but this would mean the loss of Slovenian territories for good (ibid.: 
72). Such Slovenian isolation would just mean waiting for one of two great neigh-
bours to finish up conquering the rest of Slovenian territory. This could ultimately 
jeopardise not only South Slavic reciprocity, but also the idea of the Empire’s fe-
deralisation in general (ibid.).
The decision to omit the Slovenian representatives from the process of formal-
ising the “New Course”’s political efforts was not instant. Already several years 
before the Rijeka resolution Ante Tresić-Pavičić had realised that there was no-
thing to offer to the Slovenians, especially to the Trieste Slovenians, that would sa-
tisfy at least the minimum of their national aspirations. At the annual assembly of 
“Edinost” in 1905, for example, he faced complaints from both the Slovenians and 
the Istrian Croats, that the negotiations with the Italians were too fast and that the 
opposite side did not offer anything. Tresić-Pavičić did not have any kind of com-
ment, but repeated the thesis how the Italians do not pose a greater danger than the 
Germans: “In this fight for South Slavic unity and for the formation of a strong 
chain that would prevent the Germans from penetrating the Balkans and the Adri-
atic, we need connections with Romans, especially with the Italians” (“Slovenski 
narod”, 16 January 1919). However, this was not the only opinion within the “New 
Course” movement. In the year 1905, quite a few different views existed on the 
Adriatic issue, especially regarding the Trieste problem and the solution of the Slo-
venian status in this area. The Dalmatian politician Josip Smodlaka (1869–1956) 
tried to pursue a different political strategy with innovative proposals, which should 
attract Slovenians on the side of “New Course”. Slovenian criticism and Smodla-
ka’s personal acquaintances with Slovenian colleagues from Trieste enabled him to 
realise the exceptional importance of Trieste for all three sides (Slovenians, Italians, 
and Germans). Therefore, at the gathering of the Slovenian national-radical youth 
in the beginning of September 1905, Smodlaka presented the plan of a Slovenian 
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Trieste that would be positioned beside the existing Italian city (Pleterski, 1975: 73-
74). Regardless of the fact that it was not entirely clear from his speech whether he 
proposed the division of the city or he used the model of Gorizia case (where a new 
Slovenian town was built near Italian Gorizia after World War II), the idea was in-
novative and certainly ensured the existence of Slovenians in Trieste and their con-
tact with the Adriatic Sea. This was a pragmatic attempt to solve the Italian-South 
Slavic issue, which took into account the Slovenian arguments as well. Slovenian 
politician Henrik Tuma (1858–1935) influenced Smodlaka who supported Tuma’s 
contribution in the journal “Sloboda” (Freedom) from Split, where he explained 
the geopolitical, especially economic, importance of Trieste from the South Slavic 
aspect, and the importance of the city for the Slovenian nation in the South Slavic 
context (ibid.: 80-83). Unfortunately, Smodlaka’s proposal of demarcation has nev-
er experienced the second stage of development, in which he might explain how he 
imagined the idea of two Triestes. We can only assume that this would imply some 
kind of discontinuity of the Italian territory, since the Italians were certainly not 
willing to give up Western Istria.
The reason for the failure of alternative proposals such as Smodlaka’s was the 
fact that the majority of other resolution supporters were on much more rigid stand-
points, especially already mentioned Tresić-Pavičić, who was showing much more 
sentiment for the Italian side. In the Dalmatian assembly he openly supported the 
idea of Italian University in Trieste, which was, of course, condemned by the Slo-
venians, who criticized Dalmatian inconsistency, since the Croats tried to prevent 
the establishment of an Italian elementary school in Split (“Edinost”, 23 November 
1905). Due to that Tresić-Pavičić was criticised even by the conservative journal 
“Slovenec”: “Confused Yugoslav politics of Tresić-Pavičić has bloomed its most 
lush flower these days. Mr Tresić-Pavičić has been negotiating for days (...) in order 
to establish an alliance between Romans and Slavs, of course, harming the Monar-
chy” (“Slovenec”, 16 March 1906). 
United Slovenian rejection made it impossible for the new Croatian-Serbian 
Coalition (Hrvatsko-srpska koalicija – HSK), which fostered the “New Course” 
policy, to present the criticism of the “New Course” merely as a reflection of the 
Austrian element among one part of the Slovenian (and Croatian) political elite. The 
editorial board of “Edinost” firmly defended the position that liberal Slovenians are 
not “in love” with the Austrian system, the Austrian government, or the Austrian bu-
reaucracy, and that the Austrian citizenship of Slovenians is only a fact which no one 
had asked their opinion for. However, the Italian handling with the Slavs discoura-
ges the desire of the Slovenians from Primorska to replace their citizenship with 
the Italian (“Edinost”, 20 January 1906). That fact brought even Tresić-Pavičić to 
the standpoint that Slovenians should get their access to the Adriatic Sea. He still 
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insisted that this could not by any means be through Trieste, but on one occasion he 
asserted “if the Italians would not be willing to give Slovenians access to the sea, 
we, the Croats, will do it” (Pleterski, 1975: 84). Whether this was only a diplomatic 
approach with the aim of reducing Slovenian dissatisfaction or if it was also based 
in the real plans of “New Course” is difficult to assess, since there is no other evi-
dence that would confirm the intention to realise Tresić-Pavičić’s claim. Thus, this 
was just another unsuccessful attempt to obtain Slovenian support for the “New 
Course” movement (Gross, 1960: 112-118).
Dalmatia as the Centre and Aim of the Croatian-Serbian Coalition
From the geopolitical aspect, Dalmatia was positioned as the meeting point of the 
new South Slavic strategy pillars. Although the followers of the new policy advo-
cated a partnership with the Italians and Hungarians against Austria, the paradox 
was that it was the Austrian government which enabled development of such politi-
cal alternatives. The political system in Dalmatia was significantly softer than the 
one in the Hungarian part of the Monarchy including Croatia-Slavonia (Lovrenčić, 
1972: 102-104). Even in comparison with the Istrians, the Dalmatian Croats were 
in a much better position. This was due to a small proportion of the Italian popu-
lation, whose political representatives could not occupy all crucial political posi-
tions without major constitutional violations. Possible insistence on this would be 
too risky for the authorities, since the dissatisfaction of the Dalmatian population 
could quickly spread to the still unstable area of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the 
same time, the state authorities also had to count on the connections of the Dalma-
tian Serbs with Montenegro, which represented an additional element of risk. The 
Vienna policy was consequently more liberal and permissive to the rule of the mo-
derate People’s Party (Narodna stranka), which enabled a much broader spectrum 
of Croatian cultural and political activity. Accordingly, the movement for the rein-
tegration of Dalmatia to Croatia-Slavonia enjoyed widespread support among the 
Dalmatian people, while Hungarian nationalists were publicly expressing their sup-
port to the efforts of abolishing the artificial division of Croats. This is also evident 
from the Slovenian journals’ reports: “The conference in Rijeka and its conclusions 
in Dalmatia do not have any public opponents among the Croats ... Even among the 
people exists a thought that Austria means nothing but taxes and gendarmes. ... The 
Hungarian coalition knows this, and that is now why its journals write in favour of 
Dalmatian Croats. ... Kossuth’s journal ‘Budapest’ says that the Coalition will en-
sure Dalmatia and Croatia become united, and that Dalmatians will finally be free” 
(“Slovenec”, 12 October 1905).
From the Serbian point of view the significant orthodox population in certain 
parts of the Dalmatian hinterland, as well as in eastern Herzegovina and Montene-
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gro, played an important role in the process of Belgrade’s attraction to the “New 
Course” strategy. The fundamental Serbian goal was the definition of their national 
rights, which was done with the Zadar resolution on 17 October 1905. The latter 
was added as a kind of amendment to the Resolution from Rijeka, after which 26 
Serbian representatives from Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia gave their support to 
the decisions from Rijeka (Pilar, 1990: 345-346). The Croatian request for the rein-
corporation of Dalmatia to Croatia-Slavonia was conditioned by the recognition of 
equal rights for Dalmatian Serbs to express their will regarding the “reincorpora-
tion” as the constitutional element: “As for the request of the Croatian brothers for 
the reincorporation of Dalmatia to Croatia and Slavonia, which is also guaranteed 
by a positive law, the Serbian parties are ready to invest their strength to meet this 
demand, if (...) the Croatian side acknowledges the equal rights to Serbs as Croats 
have” (ibid.: 346). This was therefore a demand for the political emancipation of 
Serbs in Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia, which was at the same time a demand for 
a unique veto right that implied the inability of Croatian decision-making without 
the consent of the Serbian representatives. 
Following two separate resolutions, the final joint Croatian-Serbian act was 
adopted on 14 November 1905 in Zadar again, where representatives of the Croa-
tian Party (Hrvatska stranka) and the Serbian People’s Party (Srpska narodna stran-
ka) met. Croatian politician Pero Čingrija (1837–1921) read out the conclusions in 
the Dalmatian assembly: “The clubs of the Croatian party and the Serbian People’s 
Party persist in principle that Croats and Serbs are one nation, that both are equal 
... For that reason Croats and Serbs in Dalmatia will work side by side as equal 
brothers in all national-political matters; they will especially try to work together 
in order to achieve the reincorporation of Dalmatia to Croatia and Slavonia as soon 
as possible, as this is the main condition for ensuring their better future. ... We also 
demand that for the people’s language in the government areas and all offices is 
used the name Croatian or Serbian language; that Dalmatian schools give to the 
Serbian name a place of honour and that the school books take into account both 
the Serbian and Croatian history, that the children learn Latin and Cyrillic alphabet, 
so they can read and write in both” (ibid.: 346-347). It seems that the final resolu-
tion had some ambiguous points. Croats and Serbs were defined in joint statement 
as the same nation, while at the same time the equality of Croats and Serbs was 
claimed. The latter in fact meant that there were two subjects with the same rights. 
In this respect, the Croatian-Serbian consensus apparently was not reached. There-
fore, both sides’ proposals were included in the final resolution even though they 
were in opposition to one another.
The cultural achievements of Serbs from Croatia and Dalmatia were by no 
means the only successes of Serbian politics at the time; even more important was 
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the fact that, in return for Serbian support for the reintegration of Dalmatia to Croa-
tia-Slavonia, some Croats resigned from the idea of Croatian Bosnia and Herzego-
vina. The latter was initially unofficial, but gradually some eminent Croatian “New 
Course” representatives disclosed in their public speeches that Bosnia and Herze-
govina belongs to the Serbian field of interest. An example of that was the speech 
of Frano Supilo in the Croatian Parliament on 25 February 1907:
The entire policy of both states (Austro-Hungary and Germany) has been directed 
to the removal of all obstacles that are on their way to the great “Drang”... If we 
acknowledge that our task is to be a Balkan guardian rather than the bridge over 
which the enemy will cross, then we also know that we can count on our Serbian 
brothers ... Recognising the Serbs we have again got their support for the rein-
corporation of Dalmatia ... But we do not know what is happening with Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. These countries are still Turkish provinces, regardless of the 
fact that some are trying to disguise that reality. In addition, although Bosnia and 
Herzegovina are Turkish provinces under the sovereignty of the Sultan, they were 
handed over to Austro-Hungarians, but only for a limited period of time, until 
the conditions in those two regions improve. However, Austro-Hungary does no-
thing to improve their situation, exactly the opposite; it is hurting them, and wants 
to create a favourable terrain for the battle against the East. And if we were lucky 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina stepped out of the Monarchy, it is quite natural that 
any true and honest Croat would prefer to give Bosnia and Herzegovina to Serbs 
rather than to foreigners (ibid.: 351).
The explicit characterisation of Austrians and Germans as enemies became 
a constant in the political discourse of the “New Course”, but in Supilo’s speech 
Croatia was for the first time in its history explicitly classified as the defender of the 
East in the context of antagonistic East-West relations.
Conceptual Differences
The resolutions from Zadar and Rijeka faced a lot of criticism, but the voices against 
those acts remained unarticulated and did not have a political body that could come 
up with a realistic program against the new policy. On the contrary, the advocates 
of the otherwise different South Slavic visions found a common framework within 
which it seemed that both, Serbs and Croats, could achieve their primary political 
goals. The HSK joined the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP), the Croatian Progres-
sive Party (Hrvatska napredna stranka – HNS), the Serbian National Independent 
Party (Srpska narodna samostalna stranka – SNSS), the Serbian National Radical 
Party (Srpska narodna radikalna stranka – SNRS) and the Social Democratic Party 
of Croatia (Socijalno-demokratska stranka Hrvatske – SDSH) into this common po-
litical formation (Ivašković, 2017: 114). Although this political group had an enor-
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mous impact in the Croatian political arena in the coming years, within the Coali-
tion itself there were significant divisions. That was a consequence of important 
discrepancies regarding the South Slavic concepts, which were evident already in 
the process of adopting Zadar’s resolution. In the initial period, the policy of the Co-
alition did not aim at creating a South Slavic state outside the dual Monarchy. The 
“New Course” was primarily an attempt of Croatian parties to attract Serbian par-
ties from Croatia for the Croatian goal of South Slavic unification within the Mo-
narchy, which would imply a Croatian majority in the consequential South Slavic 
unit. On the other side, Serbian parties in Croatia sought a way of political survival 
when international circumstances were not in their favour. In this context, it was 
important to participate with the ruling authorities and to marginalise anti-Serbian 
movements within Croatia, while waiting for the international position of Serbia to 
improve. In these relations the conflict of Croat-centrism against Serbian expan-
sionism still existed, but was at certain moments hidden by common tactical goals 
in the context of otherwise different strategies. Therefore, we can agree with the 
thesis that within Croatian-Serbian relations there was a competition, whose con-
ditions were determined by wider international political circumstances that forced 
South Slavic political groups to adapt their ideas to macro-geopolitical conditions 
(Ivašković, 2013). When one side was in a better position, it tried to impose its own 
strategic goals on the partner within the Coalition. Thus, we have to be careful with 
strong conclusions when analysing the circumstances of both adopted resolutions 
and the characteristic features of South Slavic concepts among Croatian and Ser-
bian political parties in the beginning of the 20th century. The claim that the South 
Slavic state was the Coalition’s cohesive factor could only be accepted condition-
ally, since the visions of that state differed extremely. 
In line with some previous claims (Lovrenčić, 1972: 15) we can agree that the 
wider context of German and Austro-Hungarian penetration into the Balkans and the 
Middle East, and the unstable internal situation in the Habsburg Monarchy were the 
driving force of the “New Course”. Those circumstances brought closer two South 
Slavic visions, but regardless of this we cannot talk about the fusion of two state 
conceptions into a single one. For this reason, it would be incorrect to define the 
HSK’s policy as a common “Yugoslavian” policy. The Coalition was a conglome-
rate of different parties, which had in one moment a common political goal, which 
was not yet sufficient to talk about the unification of South Slavic policies. Never-
theless, the crystallisation of relations within the particular political group brings us 
to the conclusion that the Croatian part of the “New Course” seemed to have made 
a bigger step towards the Serbian concept than vice versa. An indication which 
supports this thesis was the partnership of HSK with the Independent Radical Par-
ty (Samostalna radikalna stranka – SRS) from Serbia, which announced a turning 
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point among one section of Croatian politicians towards finding a solution in a 
wider South Slavic context (outside of the Habsburg Monarchy). This caused a lot 
of difficulties for the Croatian part of HSK. In the first place, the Austrian political 
leadership was opposed to the “New Course”, but the idea of a South Slavic state 
outside the Monarchy did not please Budapest either. In such a narrow manoeuvring 
space the Serbs and the Italians practically became the only Croatian allies. On the 
other hand, Belgrade seemed to gain more benefits, since the Croatian areas were 
of key importance in terms of achieving the fundamental Serbian geopolitical goal. 
The incitement of the anti-Habsburg mood in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
allowed for Serbian calculations that these areas could represent a kind of a restric-
tive zone to Austrian ambitions in the Balkans.
Conclusions
There are two key conclusions which arise from this study. Firstly, the policy of the 
“New Course” was born as a result of dissatisfaction among one group of Croa-
tian politicians due to the inactivity of the Habsburg authorities in resolving the 
South Slavic, more precisely Croatian, issue in the context of Austria-Hungary’s 
reform. The alternative political strategy included a radical turn in the context of 
Croatian-Austrian-Hungarian relations and in the triangle of relations between Slo-
venes, Croats, and Serbs. The primary political goal of the “New Course” was the 
reintegration of Dalmatia in the Croatian-Slavonia unit within the Hungarian part 
of the Habsburg Monarchy. In return for obtaining Italian consent for the new plan, 
this group of Croatian politicians offered support to the Italian ambitions regarding 
the demarcation line in Istria and in the Primorska region, which caused many Slo-
venian protests. 
Secondly, the “New Course” might at first be seen as a long expected consen-
sus between Croats and Serbs, but the analysis in this article undermines that thesis. 
The fact that Croats and Serbs had not reached a consensus regarding the ultimate 
political goal became evident with the formation of two political factions within 
the HSK that formed different views on the fundamental geopolitical parameters of 
the desired South Slavic state. While the Croatian part primarily sought to integrate 
Dalmatia into the Croatian kingdom with the centre in Zagreb, the Serbian parties 
understood the latter only as the short-term collateral cost; while in the long run 
they saw the HSK as an institute that would bring the Habsburg South Slavs to the 
bosom of Serbia. Inner incompatibility and strong opponents to the new strategy, 
above all Austrian politicians, were the reasons which undermined the realisation of 
the “New Course”’s aims. However, this period was a turning point in the Croatian 
political sphere, and HSK became the strongest anti-Austrian political movement 
on the Croatian soil.
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